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Individuals are not electrons. But in some situations, they behave very much alike.
Whenitcomestomanysocialandpoliticalquestions,individuals’complexattitudesand
beliefsmustbeboileddowntoasimpleyea(“spinup”)ornay(“spindown”).Although
human societies, like physical materials, are very complex, some of their properties
can be determined by understanding the interactions that occur between individuals
(“atoms”). In particular, the spread of a particular political opinion throughout a
society can be modeled as the macroscopic manifestation of the myriad exchanges
occurring at the local level between individuals and their neighbors. This model can
be used to gain a qualitative foothold on the evolution of public opinion in Iraq for
or against the U.S.-led occupation. It can also provide a mathematical instantiation of
the “oil-spot” strategy proposed by Krepinevich (2005), which in turn could lead to a
practical tool for commanders needing to allocate public relations resources in Iraq.
PART I
Introduction
How many men, women, and children must you win over to your cause before victory is
assured? Conversely, how many men, women, and children in a society must turn against
you before defeat is inevitable? Although intuition says that these numbers must be high,
a certain model of public opinion based on ideas from statistical physics suggests that the
answer may be smaller than one might at ﬁrst think.
The following model has been proposed for understanding the spread of a political
opinion throughout a society (Nowak, Szamrej, and Latan´ e 1990, 371–372; Young 2004):
View individuals like atoms in a magnetic material. Given a political question that an
individualmayeithersupportorreject,viewherasbeing+1or“spinup”ifshesupportsthe
issue, –1 or “spin down” if she rejects it. There is no “action at a distance”: each individual
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948 J. D. Farley
can only inﬂuence her immediate neighbors. The Ising model of statistical physics shows
how local interactions can explain the behavior of a macroscopic body (Ising 1925; Peierls
1936; Cipra 1987). If two neighboring micromagnets are oriented in the same direction
(both +1 or both –1), they tend to reinforce one another; if they are oriented in opposite
directions (one +1 and the other–1), they tend to cancel. The material’s overall magnetic
orientation is determined by summing up all the +1s and –1s.
Ising’s discovery is that the physics underlying the local interactions between
neighboring molecules is enough to explain the observed behavior of ferromagnetic
materials: At normal temperatures the materials do not exhibit any particular magnetic
properties (because every molecule has the same chance of being spin up as spin down, the
summation is on the average very nearly 0), but there is a critical temperature below which
all of the molecules suddenly align (either all +1 or all –1). This phenomenon is known
as a phase transition. (Non-magnetic materials can also exhibit phase transitions, as, for
instance, when water crystallizes into ice at the critical temperature 0◦C.)
What is interesting is that, under suitable conditions, human societies can also exhibit
phase transitions. Suppose it is assumed that every individual has an opinion on a question
(+1 or –1) and that an individual’s views can only be inﬂuenced by her neighbors. If
society is evenly divided on an issue (e.g., abortion, social security reform, or Iraq) and
the individuals holding view +1 are randomly distributed, the views of individuals may
change, but, overall, society will remain evenly divided on the issue (there is no emergence
of “public opinion”). If, however, the initial distribution of +1s is increased slightly (so
that it is non-trivially above 50% but still well below 100%), and one allows for individuals
to randomly switch opinions (an analogue of quantum ﬂuctuation), it can happen that the
+1 viewpoint sweeps across the society: public opinion crystallizes.
Itisnotarguedthatthesehypothesesactuallydoholdforhumansocieties(forinstance,
the initial distribution of +1s is rarely random; witness the “red state–blue state” divide
in the United States).1 But the model, especially because of its simplicity, may shed some
light on what is actually observed. In a ﬁnal section the article gives some applications to
the growth of anti-American sentiment in Iraq.
The Simulation
The article uses a probabilistic version of von Neumann’s theory of cellular automata. (For
aspects of the deterministic theory, see Wolfram 2002 and von Neumann 1966.) For N a
large integer, a two-dimensional torus viewed as an N × N grid is considered where one
considers the cells in the top row to be adjacent to the cells in the bottom row, and similarly
for the left and right columns. (This simulates the idea that New York and Los Angeles may
bemorecloselyconnectedthan,say,NewYorkandTulsa.)Foraﬁxedpbetween0and1,the
gridisrandomlypopulatedsothatpN2ofthecellsare–1.(Forthesakeofillustration,the+1
cells are colored red and the −1 cells are colored blue.) See Figures 1 and 2, a color-coded
map of the United States by county, with red for Republican-leaning counties and blue for
Democrat-leaning counties, a picture that bears a superﬁcial similarity to Figure 1.
Each cell in the torus is inﬂuenced by its neighbors as follows: Add the values of a
cell and its immediate neighbors to the north, south, east, and west. If the result is positive,
the cell will be +1 in the next time interval; otherwise it will be –1. See Figure 3 for an
illustration of this rule for a 4 × 4g r i d . 2
In the standard theory, the evolution of the cellular automaton is purely deterministic,
although it may exhibit non-periodic and seemingly “random” behavior. GenuineD
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
 
B
y
:
 
[
F
a
r
l
e
y
,
 
J
o
n
a
t
h
a
n
 
D
a
v
i
d
]
 
A
t
:
 
0
1
:
0
1
 
4
 
O
c
t
o
b
e
r
 
2
0
0
7
 
Evolutionary Dynamics of the Insurgency in Iraq 949
Figure 1. A5 0× 50 grid (red cells =+ 1, blue cells = –1).
randomness is introduced into the model to account for an individual’s changing her mind
free of the inﬂuence of her neighbors. (A magnetic dipole always has some probability of
ﬂipping from spin up to spin down, even if all of its neighbors are spin up.) The probability
of such a ﬂip-ﬂop is small but non-zero. In this simulation it is 0.001.
What is observed is that if the initial distribution is evenly split between blue and red
(i.e., p = 0.5), then it tends to remain so for a considerable period of time (usually several
thousand iterations for the grid sizes with which the simulation is concerned, N = 20 or
30, which one could call “the foreseeable future”). Even when p is increased, neither side
dominates until a considerable period of time has elapsed. But there is a critical threshold
value of p beyond which, even though p may not be high, the density of blues increases to
a high level, to the 90% range or higher.
Figure 4 gives the results in more detail. For grid sizes such as N = 20 or N = 30,
the simulation was run 40 times with different initial densities p of blue cells. The graphs
represent averages over the 40 runs for ﬁxed p and N. The initial distribution was recorded
(exactly pN2 blue cells, rounded down to the nearest integer) at time t = 0, and then the
distribution after 1,000 steps. In the deterministic setting, represented by the ﬁrst graph,
populationsarecompletelystableveryearlyon.Forreasonsdiscussedlater,thepopulations
are not completely stable in the quantum setting; it appears as if the inevitable end-result
is that blue will dominate totally. Surprisingly, the graphs obtained seem to be independent
o ft h eg r i ds i z eN.
One notes that for p = 0.5, neither blue nor red dominates the society in the short-
or medium-term future. (If one side dominates in the long-term, it is only because of
random ﬂuctuations that may, for instance, take p above the critical density. Eventually,
the minority color will die, because the quantum ﬂuctuations eat away at the edges ofD
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Evolutionary Dynamics of the Insurgency in Iraq 951
Figure 3. (a) A 4 × 4 grid. (b). The same 4 × 4 grid after one time-step.
that color’s islands.) But above the critical density (p > 0.55 in the 20 × 20 case), blue’s
population very rapidly rises to close to 90% within 1,000 iterations, whereas even just a
fraction below this threshold, blue does not gain so much so quickly and still must contend
with a signiﬁcant number of reds into the medium- and long-term future. This is a type 2
phase transition (Wolfram 2002).
Note that the critical density only applies when one has a random initial distribution.
Once the simulation runs, structure emerges in the society (for example, islands or strips
of red cells) that would resist elimination but for the quantum ﬂuctuations. (For example,
a2× 2 square of red cells would never disappear in the deterministic case.) Thus, blueD
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952 J. D. Farley
may increase its percentage of the population to 70% and still not totally dominate red for
thousands of iterations, even though the critical density may be well below 0.7.
Shortcomings of the Model and Some Generalizations
A justiﬁcation of the merits of running computer experiments has been given elsewhere
(e.g., Bak and Chen 1991, 46; Johnson 1999; Lustick, Miodownik, and Eidelson 2004, 212;
Orbell, Morikawa, Hartwig, Hanley, and Allen 2004, 3; Srbljinovic, Penzar, Rodik, and
Kardov2003,1.4).Themeritsoftheagent-basedmodelingapproachmaybefoundinMacy
and Willer (2002); for the use of cellular automata speciﬁcally, see Hegselmann and Flache
(1998). For a mathematical approach to the formation of public opinion using differential
equations, see Abelson (1964); for one using matrices, see Harary (1959); for one using
directed graphs, see French (1956). For a sample of other work using physical models for
social phenomena, see Kenrick, Li, and Butner (2003, 14) and Lewenstein, Nowak, and
Latan´ e (1992). A good summary of other works discussing phase transitions on networks
can be found in Newman (2003, section 8.4). For an example of using computers to model
conﬂict, see Cederman (2003).
Figure 4. Graphs of the data after t = 1,000 steps. Dynamic evolution of the automaton with and
without quantum ﬂuctuations. (Continued)D
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Evolutionary Dynamics of the Insurgency in Iraq 953
Figure 4. (Continued)
There are some interesting mathematical questions pertaining to this speciﬁc model.
First, it would be interesting to prove analytically that the critical density exists and to
calculate it. It would also be interesting to discover the function that gives the expected
percentage of blues as a function of t for ﬁxed p and N. Another interesting mathematical
question is the behavior of islands. Because of the quantum ﬂuctuation, it appears that
islands inevitably decay (much as is the case with black holes under real quantum
ﬂuctuation; e.g., Schwarz 2005). What is this rate of decay? These questions of course
depend on the speciﬁc construction of the model, but there are similar questions that might
apply to more general models that would be equally, if not more, interesting.
One of the most obvious critiques of the model is its simplicity. The model certainly
lacks the complexity of other simulations, for instance, those found in the works mentioned
earlier.Thisweaknessisonlyapparent.Themodelobviouslyrecallsthehousingsegregation
model of Schelling in the 1970s in which he demonstrates with a simple rule set that seg-
regated housing patterns can emerge even under high levels of tolerance (Schelling 1971).
It is well known that simple dynamical rules can produce complex, even chaotic, behavior
(Mandelbrot 1982; Wolfram 2002). As has been observed, when trying to come to grips
with fundamental phenomena, at least qualitatively, simplicity can be an advantage (Macy
and Willer 2002, 162).3 The use of quantum ﬂuctuations enables one to model opinionD
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954 J. D. Farley
change. Zaller attempts to explain why individuals change their opinions when confronted
by pollsters in successive months. “The generally accepted conclusion...has been that
response instability...predominantly represents some sort of chance variation” (Zaller
1992, 30–31). Zaller himself posits that people do not have ﬁxed opinions; they respond to
pollsters with answers that depend on what is “at the top of the head” (Zaller 1992, 49).4
It is not so much that the present model is an improvement over other agent-based
models than it is that the approach is different. This model is attempting to isolate a
phenomenon that may be independent of the speciﬁc set of rules applied.
In this regard, the choice of simple rules has two advantages. First, it enables one
to focus on what is causing the phenomenon of interest without the obfuscation of other
complicatingvariables.Second,itcouldperhapsserveasthefoundationalmodelforaseries
of generalizations: What is the most general type of graph that yields a phase transition? It
is conceivable that the quality “graph G + rule set R have a phase transition” is preserved
under small modiﬁcations (conceptually) to the graph and rule set. Thus, there may be a
pathway to proving a general theorem about what graphs with what sets of rules possess
phase transitions, a result that might be inaccessible if its discovery were attempted from
the beginning. To draw an analogy with the Church-Turing thesis, one deduces that any
type of computer can be simulated by a Turing machine by showing, for example, that
a standard Turing machine with alphabet {0,1} can simulate a Turing machine with any
ﬁnite alphabet; that a standard Turing machine with a one-dimensional tape can simulate
a Turing machine that works on a two-dimensional grid; that a standard Turing machine
can simulate a non-deterministic Turing machine, and so on. (Turing 1936–1937). It may
in fact be the case that only very light conditions are required of the graph and rule set in
order to produce a phase transition, just as (to give another very loose analogy) Arrow’s
impossibility theorem (Arrow 1951) or G¨ odel’s incompleteness theorems (G¨ odel 1931)
only require very reasonable conditions on the objects of interest (voting systems and
axiom schemes for mathematics, respectively). The goal is ultimately to produce a theorem
that could handle a much more complex system.
There are many directions in which one could expand the model. The most obvious
one is to change the graph (see Flache and Hegselmann 2001; Kacperski and Holyst 2000).
To better approximate real societies, one could see what results one gets with small-world
networksorrandomgraphs(WattsandStrogatz1998;Bollob´ as2001).Also,amorerealistic
way to handle islands would be to increase their resistance as their area shrinks (e.g., the
ShortStrandinBelfast).Onecouldchangethenumberofneighbors(forinstance,onecould
use all eight neighbors instead of just the four to the north, south, east, and west; or one
could create a hexagonal grid). One could add edges between cells that in the basic model
are distance twoapart (tomodel the fact that one’s inﬂuence does not merely end withone’s
neighbors, and that the set of one’s neighbors itself has a structure); in this case, one may
add a kind of “inverse square” law, limiting the inﬂuence one has on these distance-two
neighbors. (Such ideas formed the basis of the inﬂuence rules of Nowak et al. 1990.) One
could introduce weightings across the board, for example, by using +1 for red and –0.5 for
blue, or by giving one’s own opinion extra weight when forming one’s opinion in the next
timeinterval.5Inrealsocieties,notallopinionshaveequalweight;thereareopinionleaders
interspersed throughout the population (Green et al. 2004; Siegel 2005). There is also no
reason why opinions must only be along one dimension; individuals could have opinions
on multiple issues or there could be multiple possible opinions for any given issue.
Along similar lines, one could model the effect of propaganda, viewed as a magnetic
ﬁeld (so that cells tend toward the –1 opinion, for instance), or as a periodic pulse (every
10 time steps, for instance, to correspond to the news cycle).D
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Evolutionary Dynamics of the Insurgency in Iraq 955
One could also analyze the effect on the model of introducing random long-distance
connections, as when, for instance, one meets the acquaintance of an acquaintance in a
far-away city. One could also more directly model mobility (cf. Sakoda 1971). One could
also study the effect of barriers on inﬂuence propagation (e.g., oceans). The connection
with the “critical mass” theory of collective action (Granovetter 1978) and the notion of
“self-organized criticality” (Bak and Chen 1991) also deserve attention. There may also be
fruitful applications to the understanding of the process by which juries reach a consensus
(Tanford and Penrod 1983).
It would be interesting to understand how the present model deviates from the real
world, in an attempt to see why phase transitions do not occur; or, if they have occurred
in certain historical situations, to ﬁnd them. Alternatively, one could try to create artiﬁcial
environments in which the rules of the model do apply to see if the simulated results occur
in reality. This might be done along the same lines as sleep experiments, in which 100
individuals (for example) are kept secluded in separate rooms and can only communicate
with their neighbors.
Occupational Hazards: Implications for Iraq
Despite the shortcomings and primitive nature of the present model, there seem to be a
number of potential applications. Networks in the real world will not exhibit the regularity
and structure of the torus presently used. But perhaps actual networks—for example
networksconsistingofdifferenttelevisionmarkets—couldbestudiedsothatgroupswishing
to inﬂuence public opinion (e.g., campaigns for political candidates) need not spend their
resources trying to change every node in the network, but only a fraction of the nodes. This
couldrepresentaconsiderablesavingsforthegroupinquestion(provided,ofcourse,thatthe
topologyoftheappropriateinﬂuencenetworkswasunderstood).Anotherapplicationmight
be to mathematical epidemiology and virus propagation: +1 indicates that an individual
has a cold, –1 indicates she does not. If a majority of your neighbors have colds, you are
more likely to get a cold; otherwise, your body’s natural defenses will enable you to stay
healthy or recover from your cold, at least for one time step.
One could also model a situation where, for instance, negative views or rumors are
spread throughout a population. For example, one could model the graph representing
familialrelationshipsinIraqisociety,andseewhatdensityofthepopulationmustexperience
an untoward event at the hands of occupation forces before the entire population has a
negative view of the occupation (the initial –1 nodes being, for example, prisoners at Abu
Ghraib).
On 1 May 2003, U.S. President George W. Bush declared an end to “major combat
operations” in Iraq. It was clear, however, that the battle for the hearts and minds of the
Iraqi people had only just begun. If the present hypotheses apply in some form to human
societies, the results suggest that seemingly low percentages of antipathy toward the U.S.
occupation forces could tip dramatically and without warning in favor of the insurgency. It
therefore behooves policymakers to pay closer attention to public attitudes, even when it
seems as if there is little cause for alarm.
Outlook: A Theory of Everyone?
Using a simple analogy from statistical physics, one can see what may be a general
phenomenon about the spread of political inﬂuence and the formation of public opinion.D
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956 J. D. Farley
Determining how far this model deviates from reality would be as worthwhile an area of
investigation as determining how much the properties of the model carry over to other
networks, and whether historical or laboratory examples could be found in the realm of
human interactions.
Simple mathematics can be used to elucidate the fundamental interactions between
atoms. Although one should not and must not look for a “theory of everyone,” one
also should not balk at using simple mathematics to try to elucidate some aspects of
collective social behavior. The language of mathematics merely enables someone to
state his or her assumptions and conclusions, and to present his or her reasoning, clearly
and unambiguously. In the case of Iraq, it is important for policymakers and military
commanders to know that the difference between mission accomplished and mission
impossible may be as narrow as the knife’s edge.
PART II: EVOLUTIONARY DYNAMICS OF PUBLIC OPINION
Maximum Territorial Control in the Battle for Hearts and Minds
This section applies the general considerations of Part I to a speciﬁc optimization problem.
How does one convert a maximum amount of territory to one’s side with constrained
resources?Supposeapoliticalpartyoramilitarycommanderispresentedwiththefollowing
situation: She is trying to gain mastery over a region. This region has n loci of control (in
the example that follows, there are ﬁve important cities in a country); each of these loci
will enable the commander’s forces to exert inﬂuence over a certain region surrounding it,
her inﬂuence dwindling as the distance from that locus of power grows. The commander
has the resources only to take over k of the n loci. (The exact number may depend on which
loci are taken; see the possible expansions of the model in what follows.) The other n − k
will remain hostile. Which k should the commander concentrate her resources on in order
to maximize the amount of territory under her control?
The Simulation
There is a N × N grid of cells, that is, N2 total cells. Initialize all of the grid cells to zero. A
number of special red “source” cells are maintained at +1 throughout the simulation, and
another number of blue source cells are maintained at −1. The rule to update a cell is to
take the average of a cell with its nearest horizontal and vertical neighbors:
P
n+1
i,j =
P n
i,j + P n
i+1,j + P n
i−1,j + P n
i,j+1 + P n
i,j −1
5
When the computed average for a cell is greater than zero, that cell is colored a shade of
red; if it is less than zero, it is colored a shade of blue. White cells indicate the transition
from red to blue regions. A simulation is run until an equilibrium is reached.
Results and Discussion
In the speciﬁc example, there is a 20 × 20 grid of cells, that is, N = 20. There are also ﬁve
source cells, any three of which can be chosen as blue sources (−1s), and the other two are
red sources (+ls). All ten possible conﬁgurations of three blue sources and two red sourcesD
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Evolutionary Dynamics of the Insurgency in Iraq 957
Figure 5. The diffusion of public opinion.D
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958 J. D. Farley
Table 1
Maximum territorial control in the battle for hearts and minds
Blue Red
Blue
territory
Red
territory
Blue
opinion
Red
opinion Time
ABC DE 54.5 45.5 29.0 18.1 432
ABD CE 64.2 35.8 29.8 12.6 377
ABE CD 64.5 35.5 25.8 10.0 720
ACD BE 66.2 33.8 37.0 11.5 561
ACE BD 73.8 26.2 31.6 7.6 628
ADE BC 74.5 25.5 39.3 8.9 842
BCD AE 65.5 34.5 24.0 9.2 857
BCE AD 57.0 43.0 30.8 17.4 146
BDE AC 67.8 32.2 30.1 10.5 752
CDE AB 68.0 32.0 38.6 10.7 912
are run, and the results tabulated (Figure 5). The metrics that are tabulated are
blue territory =
number of blue cells
total number of cells
and
blue opinion =
1
N2

(i,j) = blue
 Pi,j
 
These values are given as percentages in Table 1. Also given is the time to stabilization,
which is that time after which applying the rule does not change the value of any grid cell
(up to the precision of the computer).
Implications for Winning Hearts and Minds
In a real military scenario, ground must not only be taken, it must be kept. Resources being
ﬁnite (e.g., the U.S. troops were, according to reports, spread thin during the initial phases
of the 2003 Iraq War), a commander may wish to focus her attention on speciﬁc spots. In an
occupation, it is natural to assume that the regions not under the inﬂuence of the occupier
will remain hostile. The commander wishes to maximize the area under her control. Where
will the greatest payoff be? The same results would apply to a contest between two political
parties in a region. In this interpretation, the model might lead to the “optimal” way to
gerrymander political turf.
Territory vs. Hearts and Minds
More realistic models would include (at least) the following reﬁnements: Control of area
is different from attaining victory in “the battle for hearts and minds” (e.g., control of
vast territory in the Soviet Union by German forces during World War II; the size of
Tamerlane’s empire; etc.). Deﬁning “territorial control” by counting the number of blue
squares therefore represents a “with us or against us” philosophy. The “degree of blueness”
more accurately represents the degree to which the battle for hearts and minds has beenD
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won.Themodelincorporatesthisbysummingoverfractionalamountsofblueness.Perhaps
there are non-trivial conﬁgurations for which this quantity depends only on the number k
of occupied loci, not their location.
Modeling Resistance and Resources
A very simple, but very necessary, modiﬁcation is to weight each locus by the difﬁculty of
taking it (i.e., Fallujah vs. Kirkuk in Kurdistan). One suggestion is to choose weights based
on population. (Deﬁning a unit of area by population, another option, would be similar to
thewaycongressionaldistrictsaredeﬁnedintheUnitedStates.)Conversely,certainregions
might be more highly valued—for instance, if they contained natural resources—so one
might wish to weight squares according to their value.
Boundary Effects and the Line of Control
Another improvement would be to take into account boundary effects. Real regions have
neighbors. (In Iraq, there might be a constant source of “redness” on the border with Iran.)
Along these lines, it would be interesting to see if it is somehow “worse” to choose corner
points.
Simplicity Theory
Alongtheselines,another“boundary”isthewhitelinethatseparatestheblueandredzones
of control. It would be interesting to be able to analytically describe this “Mason–Dixon
Line” (i.e., without having to run the simulation). It would also be interesting to be able to
analytically describe the length of time it takes until the equilibrium is reached.
The ultimate question, of course, is if it is possible to analytically describe the best
conﬁguration, just given the locations of the n loci and the number k. This leads to a set
of questions that, on the surface, seem to fall into the realm of complexity theory. The key
difference, however, is that in complexity theory one is confronted with problems for large
values of n, whereas, in the present case, n is unlikely to be more than 50 (and possibly
no more than 5, as in the example). Thus “exponential time” algorithms might yield the
optimal conﬁguration in a feasible amount of time; conversely, known “polynomial time”
algorithms could conceivably be too time-consuming, if they require vast amounts of time
for overhead, or if the degree of the polynomial is too large.
Scale-Freeness
Finally, we note that the present simulation is scale-free in the sense that the same model
would apply if one wanted to determine the best cities in a country to take over, or the best
districts within a city (for instance, the optimal mosques to try to sway in order to have
inﬂuence over the largest amount of territory within a city that is crucial, but still largely
hostile).
The Diffusion of Public Opinion
The diffusion of heat in an object is a well-known and well-studied phenomenon. In
mathematical physics, thediffusionofheat over timeisdescribed by thediffusionequation
∂T
∂t
=∇ 2TD
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where T(x, y, z, t) is the temperature of an object as a function of space and time, and ∇2 is
the Laplacian operator. The Laplacian in two dimensions is given by
∇2T =
∂2T
∂x2 +
∂2T
∂y2
This article discretizes the diffusion equation, using what is called a backward Euler for
the time derivative and a center difference for the Laplace operator. (The author thanks a
reader of this manuscript for these comments and the references Tikhonov and Samarskii
1963 and Strikwerda 1989.)
T
n+1
i,j − T n
i,j
 t
=
T n
i+1,j − 2T n
i,j + T n
i−1,j
 x2 +
T n
i,j+1 − 2T n
i,j + T n
i,j−1
 x2
Rearranging, one has
T
n+1
i,j = T n
i,j +
 t
 x2

T n
i+1,j + T n
i −1,j + T n
i,j+1 + T n
i,j−1 − 4T n
i,j

When  t/ x2 = 1/5, this becomes
T
n+1
i,j =
T n
i,j + T n
i+1,j + T n
i−1,j + T n
i,j+1 + T n
i,j−1
5
This is the averaging rule used for the present simulations. Hence, one could argue by
analogy that the simulations being performed are modeling the diffusion of public opinion.
Note, however, that some caution needs to be exercised when discretizing differential
equations (Durrett and Levin 1994).
Notes
1. Nor is the author asserting that phase transitions do not occur.
2. Individuals are often inﬂuenced by their neighbors, if all the residents on a street wish to use
thesamegarbagecollectioncompany,forinstance,orselltheirlandtoadeveloper(whowillpaymore
if he can get all of the properties at once). There is also the intimidation effect: an antiwar Democrat
mayfeelitisunsafetoshowhiscolorsifeveryoneonhisstreethasanSUVwitha“supportthetroops”
ribbon.Someoftheideasfromsocialpsychologyonproximityandsocializationcouldalsobebrought
to bear. The proximity-attraction principle, that one is more likely to like familiar people, could be
stretched to suggest that one is more likely to be like familiar people, that is, his or her neighbors. If
the blues and reds are interpreted as being distinct political parties, further justiﬁcation comes from
Green, Schickler, and Palmquist (2004), chapter 1: “party identiﬁcation...is often acquired early in
life as a product of one’s family environment.... [P]artisan identities...also change as regional and
occupational mobility put adults into contact with new friends and social groups, some of which may
have different partisan coloration.” Our rule also mirrors Zaller’s Axiom A4, the “Response Axiom”:
“Individuals answer survey questions by averaging across the considerations that are immediately
salient or accessible to them” (Zaller 1992, 49).
3. “[I]f the goal is to deepen our understanding of some fundamental process, then simplicity
of the assumptions is important and realistic representation of all the details of a particular setting is
not.” (Axelrod 1997, 25, quoted in Macy and Willer 2002, 147.)
4. Thepresentauthor’sviewisthatthiscorrespondstothe“hiddenvariables”notioninquantum
theory,contrastingwiththenotionthatstatesofphysicalsystemsareonlyindeterminatewavescapableD
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Evolutionary Dynamics of the Insurgency in Iraq 961
of taking on many different values (the states become deﬁnite only when an observation is made and
the wave function “collapses”).
5. There has been considerable empirical evidence showing, for instance, that most individuals
are holders of “non-opinions” and “non-attitudes” (Zaller 1992). According to Converse, “[L]arge
portionsoftheelectoratedonothavemeaningfulbeliefs”(Converse1964,245).Theseportionsmight
be represented as 0s.
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